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ABSTRACT: This paper expands Gilbert’s emotional mode of argumentation (1997). First, general 
concerns with arguments that stray from the traditional approach are addressed. Then a classification 
system for different types of emotional arguments is developed. Some of the criteria that help determine 
emotional arguments include dialogue types, arguers involved, as well as the use of emotion.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
That emotions play a role in argumentation is an idea contested by probably very few 
argumentation theorists. However, recognizing that emotions play a role in argumentation 
and further acknowledging emotional arguments as credible arguments in their own right 
are very different admissions. This paper focuses on emotional argumentation primarily 
in terms of interaction or interpersonal disagreement spaces. The existing literature on 
emotional arguments is scant, though there are theorists within the field who write about 
its legitimacy or future development. Dale Hample states that emotional arguments 
should be studied “because arguing is a motivated human activity, reasoning always has 
an emotional element” (2005, p. 128). However, Michael A. Gilbert notes a particular 
trend has presided within the field of argumentation: “certain very human factors such as 
emotion and intuition have been viewed as extraneous to proper argumentation and solely 
the domain of other disciplines (Psychology and Communication Theory) or, even worse, 
the concern of sophists and manipulators” (1997a, p. 26). In response to this typical view 
of arguments that are primarily emotional, in addition to acknowledging that emotional 
arguments are inherent in most argumentative contexts, I quote Douglas Walton who 
writes that, “emotional appeals can be reasonable arguments in some cases” (1992, p. 
255). Devoting a book to the place of emotion within arguments, Walton shows how 
emotions in arguments can be fallacious but also how they can be helpful to the overall 
goals of a particular argument.  
Focusing on emotions as functional aspects of argumentation, this paper is 
divided into two main parts. First I recapitulate existing theory on emotional arguments, 
focusing on Gilbert’s emotional mode (1997a), and then more briefly on Ben-Ze’ev 
(1995, 1996) and Plantin (1999), who provide cognitive and linguistic approaches 
respectively to emotion in argument. Stemming from Gilbert’s work, I then begin a 
preliminary descriptive account of a more advanced notion of emotional argumentation 
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than currently exists. This includes further defining emotional arguments and explaining 
their presence in critical discussions, debates, negotiations, and quarrels, four different 
argumentative dialogues outlined by Walton (1990). This account is by no means 
complete but rather should be thought of as a beginning to the vast nature of emotional 
argumentation. Before concluding I introduce a tool for dispute resolution practitioners, 
the social style model (Furlong 2005), which can help argumentation practitioners better 
understand and navigate emotional arguments. Whether practitioners are analysts 
performing empirical studies of emotional arguments, professionals who deal with 
arguments continually as part and parcel to their work, or any individual who confronts 
emotional arguments, this work is ultimately aimed at providing insight and tools to help 
them with the emotional mode of argumentation.  
  
2. EXISTING LITERATURE ON EMOTIONAL ARGUMENTS  
 
2.1 Risks of studying emotional argumentation  
 
Depending on how emotion in argumentation is studied by an analyst, there run different 
risks, of which Hample mentions at least three. A third party observing argumentative 
communication can interfere with the natural flow of the emotions of the arguers. Second, 
if equipment is used to study the physiology of emotions during argumentation, it can be 
rather intrusive. Finally, post-argument interviews can be contaminated by the 
interviewer’s questions (2005, p. 143). While these are important challenges to 
acknowledge in the study of emotional argument, risk-preventative measures can be 
worked on and worked out. Plus, the more traditional mode of argument may run some of 
the same risks as well as others. For instance, the first concern is that having an analyst 
present while an argumentative exchange takes place runs the risk of influencing the 
arguers, perhaps by having them suppress their emotions or maybe even exaggerate them. 
An analyst does not even have to be present – a video recorder can be recording the 
interaction and the arguments can still be influenced. In any case, the naturalness of the 
emotions can be affected, hindering the natural argument. The main issue here is that a 
third party to the emotional argument upsets the flow of the argument, possibly changing 
its original form. This could be a risk in any mode of argumentation where there is an 
analyst present. The reasons could be altered as well (not just the emotions), whether they 
end up being suppressed, exaggerated, made-up, and so on because there is an observer. 
Here too, there could just be a simple recorder in the room for the purposes of compiling 
a transcript of the interaction, and reasoning could be influenced.  
In cases of the more traditional conception of argument with third party analysts, 
an analyst typically studies the strength of the reasons as justification or refutation of 
views. Analogous to this, emotional argumentation analysts can do the same – study the 
use, strength, or justificatory purposes of emotion. Whatever the argument occurring, 
alterations can always be made, conscious or not, because of the presence of a third party. 
Once understood and acknowledged, the same process of argument location and maybe 
evaluation can begin to take place with emotional arguments that have been in place with 
traditional arguments for years. The real difference for analysts of traditional and 
emotional arguments is that the former already has a general theory associated with it, 
while the latter is still quite unexplored territory.  
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2.2 The emotional mode of argumentation according to Gilbert  
 
In Coalescent Argumentation (1997a) Gilbert introduces the multi-modal model of 
argumentation, which includes four modes of argumentation. Developed, in essence, to 
address real people in real argumentative situations the four modes are the logical, the 
emotional, the visceral, and the kisceral, where the latter three modes are considered 
additions to the first more traditional mode of argument, what Gilbert calls the critical-
logical tradition. The emotional mode is the only one I draw on in this project, though the 
kisceral and visceral modes are not entirely unconnected to the basic foundations that 
guide it. Each of these three modes presents alternatives to the traditional critical-logical 
mode. Gilbert stresses that what they offer is a taxonomy of argumentative 
communication – in other words, one can question what mode gives any argument its 
strength (1997a, p. 79). Important to keep in mind is that multi-modal argumentation 
deems that arguments can have each mode present at any time, and often do, though there 
is one mode that is more emphasized. For instance, “a good emotional reason might be a 
poor logical or kisceral reason” (1997a, p. 83).  
 According to Gilbert emotions can be present in arguments as reasons, emotional 
grounds, or as a means of expressing arguments. In emotional arguments the strength of 
the argument comes primarily from its emotional content (1997a, p. 83). Emotional 
arguments better communicate human aspects of arguments that might otherwise be 
ignored, yet important to the argument in terms of structure, delivery, and reception. They 
could indicate an arguer’s degree of commitment to her claim, or how genuine an arguer 
is in presenting her argument. These directly link to the listeners receiving arguments – 
noting the above criteria could influence how a listener accepts, questions, or rejects 
claims made. Gilbert writes, emotional arguments “include such elements as degree of 
commitment, depth, and the extent of feeling, sincerity, and degree of resistance” (1997a, 
p. 84). Thus an emotionally-involved arguer could add credibility or strength to the 
argument. 
Consider Marco and Lee, who have been business partners for the last five years. 
Marco does not agree with Lee’s latest argument about starting to hire professional 
accountants to take care of their financial business matters, but Marco also sees that Lee 
is not that committed to the idea, as Lee stated it casually and began talking about other 
matters. In this situation there is no obvious degree of commitment or strength to the idea, 
and so Marco does not feel obligated to address it. If Lee had instead stated that the two 
of them really need to consider hiring someone who knows the ins and outs of 
accounting, perhaps becoming excitable – or more intense about the idea because Lee 
anticipates there might be hesitation from Marco – then Marco, seeing a deeper level of 
commitment and seriousness, would likely engage in further argumentative dialogue and 
exploration regarding the hire. An analogy I want to specifically point out here is that Lee 
could have advocated the hire with a number of well-thought out reasons based on 
research, but Lee instead becomes more excitable and aggressive about the idea. In either 
case, we should have tools to at least map out the argument and possibly analyze its 
strength. This exists for more traditional approaches to argument; the reasons could be 
evaluated for their acceptability, relevance, and overall sufficiency (Johnson and Blair 
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2006). But, there are no means to work with the situation above; for some models or 
theories of argumentation actually, Lee might not even be making an argument.  
 
2.3 Other conceptions of emotional arguments  
 
Gilbert’s mode of emotional arguments is what motivates this project. What it lacks in its 
generality is technical rigour, and whether or not a model of emotional argument needs 
such is still a question. Here I quickly introduce two authors who have a more detailed, 
and stricter, sense of emotional arguments.  
In “Emotions and argumentation” (1995) Aaron Ben-Ze’ev asserts (1) that 
emotions do constitute a particular kind of argumentation; (2) emotions are rational; and, 
(3) emotions can constitute efficient argumentation. For Ben-Ze’ev an emotional 
argument is specifically one which has emotion(s) used as reason(s) for a claim or action 
– a notion of emotional argument that coincides with Gilbert’s mode. Taking it to a 
different level than Gilbert though, Ben-Ze’ev’s psychologically-informed position 
deems that there are four aspects inherent in an emotion within emotional argumentation. 
An emotion has cognitive, evaluative, motivational, and feeling aspects (Ben-Ze’ev 1995, 
p. 190). Each of these is required for an emotional argument to have occurred, and they 
can be considered different aspects of a single state (Ben-Ze’ev 1996, p. 237).  
Referring to the example between Lee and Marco above, imagine the two had 
been going back and forth in their deliberation regarding hiring a professional accountant 
to take over the small business accounting matters they had been working through  
themselves since the inception of the business. Lee would much rather hire someone now 
that their business is slowly growing and they are not aware of the entire accounting 
system, its ins and outs. Marco thinks they have been handling matters fairly well, and 
until there are serious problems they come against in their accounting measures, why 
bother paying someone to do what they have been doing? These are the arguments 
verbalized by the pair, and they seemingly both make sense, or at least one is not 
drastically stronger than the other. Now, in continuing their argumentative discussion 
about hiring a professional accountant, Lee decides not to do anymore of the accounting; 
either they hire someone or Marco can take care of it alone if he really wants. Thinking 
this is a drastic decision, Marco questions Lee, and Lee responds that he does not 
understand the accounting cycle like Marco anyway. It frustrates Lee that no matter how 
hard he tries Marco usually has the solutions.  
This has now become an emotional argument according to Ben-Ze’ev. The 
cognitive aspect involves Lee’s awareness of Marco’s accounting skills. Recognizing that 
Lee’s skills are not as advanced as Marco’s, perhaps even inferior, is the evaluative 
aspect. The motivational aspect prompts Lee to remove the circumstances that make Lee 
feel frustrated with accounting, less competent, thus hiring someone so that Lee and 
Marco are not left doing the accounting activities. And, lastly, the feeling element 
involves Lee’s frustration at always coming second to Marco, thus feeling inferior. For 
Ben-Ze’ev emotions constitute arguments when they are the reason for some claim or 
action. Thinking of Lee’s feelings of inferiority, as an emotional state of frustration, 
prompt his proposals for action (either an accountant is hired, or Marco takes on the 
accounting alone; either way, Lee is not putting himself in the situation that makes him 
feel inferior).   
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 For Ben-Ze’ev emotional arguments are common, practical situations, associated 
with active arguers, occurring in the context of interpersonal situations. Consequently, 
emotional arguments are rational in the sense that they are functional, associated and 
coinciding with the given context (1996, p. 193). And, they are efficient in the messages 
they send – their persuasive power tends to be strong (1996, p. 197). Ben-Ze’ev thus 
provides a psychologically-informed account of emotions in emotional arguments, where 
emotions act solely as reasons.  
 Christian Plantin, in “Arguing emotions” (1999), states that emotions have 
cognitive components because they are linked with language associations, and people 
react differently to emotions. Thus, like Ben-Ze’ev Plantin has a psychological approach 
to the subject of emotional argumentation. Unlike Ben-Ze’ev though, Plantin does not 
focus just on the emotion. Rather, the emotional dimensions of argument can be 
investigated by recognizing “emotional sentences,” those sentences that tell us that 
someone is experiencing an emotion, and by locating the “experiencer,” the subject 
experiencing the emotion, plus the “emotion terms,” which are the societal labels that get 
attached to emotions (Plantin 1999, pp. 5-7). His theory relies on emotions that are 
declared in the context of argumentation, and not on inner states that one cannot be sure 
about. And, different from Ben-Ze’ev, Plantin focuses on emotions as claims.  
 When Lee asserts that he will never understand accounting like Marco, and it is 
frustrating for him to do accounting at all alongside Marco, Lee is the experiencer of the 
emotion, frustration. Once the experiencer and the emotion are determined, one is ready 
to construct the context that prompted the emotion according to Plantin. 
  
2.4 Types of emotional arguments summarized 
 
Gilbert states that emotions can be used as reasons within arguments, as well as means of 
expressing an argument. Ben-Ze’ev gives a detailed conception of the emotion in the 
former context, where emotion functions as a reason for a claim. In other words, Ben-
Ze’ev gives an account of what exactly constitutes emotion. Plantin looks at arguments 
where emotions make up the claim and reconstructs the situation to determine the reasons 
leading to the claim. This gives us three different ways that emotion can play out in 
argumentation, and they all represent the position of the arguer who expresses reasons 
and claims. I add two more to them, already introduced in Carozza (2002), prompted by 
Walton’s work (1992) on the ad misericordiam and ad baculum. In an ad misericordiam 
an arguer appeals to the emotions of her listeners, specifically pity and sympathy for 
others, so that an action or claim will be accepted based on appealing to those types of 
empathic emotions (Walton 1992, p. 259). In an ad baculum an arguer evokes emotions 
of fear from her listeners; this involves stirring up feelings of threat, terror, or anxiety that 
otherwise would not have been triggered (1992, p. 259). These last two means of 
emotional argument represent the response of the listener in argumentation; thus, while 
the former three focus on the arguer’s use of emotion, the latter two represent the 
listeners’ emotional response to an argument. While this is not an exhaustive list, and it 
should be further developed with the help of empirical research, it is a start to thinking of 
the different ways that emotion plays a part in argumentation. I summarize with a list of 
the ways emotional arguments can occur: 
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i. Emotions can be used to express arguments (Gilbert 1997). 
ii. Emotions can be used as grounds for a claim (Ben-Ze’ev 1995; Gilbert 1997).  
iii. Emotions can make up a claim (Plantin 1999). 
iv. Empathic emotions of the audience can be appealed to (Walton 1992). 
v. Emotions of fear in an audience can be evoked (Walton 1992). 
 
3. DISSENT IN THE MIDST OF EMOTIONAL TERRITORY  
 
I turn now to articulating the definitions of argument and emotion that ground this 
approach, and then I show how emotions function in arguments in terms of fulfilling a 
particular argument dialogue’s goals (see Walton 1990). This at least should demonstrate 
the functional aspects of emotional arguments.  
The motivation for developing such an account at all stems from a concern with 
the practical implications of theory. Considering emotions in argumentation theory brings 
along negative and positive attributes. To begin with the negative, there is so much more 
to be aware of as argumentation analysts, with very little theory to ground it all, and 
sometimes this criteria is not wholly familiar to us or obvious based on individual life 
experiences, exposure, cultures, and so on. The positive attributes, however, far outweigh 
the negative. Recognizing the role of emotion in argumentative discourse provides more 
context or details that would otherwise be construed as fallacious or peripheral to the core 
argument. The emotion that situates an argument provides a “big picture” effect, allowing 
different contextually relevant analyses of a given argumentative interaction, and it 
balances the focus between the argument itself and its arguers. In the end, the purpose of 
articulating this approach at all is for the benefit of those who deal with emotional 
arguments on a daily basis: lawyers, judges, arbitrators, mediators, counselors, 
psychologists, friends, parents, etc. We all come across emotional arguments, some 
professionally and some more personally, and yet an expanded theory that first explains 
and then gives tools to deal with these arguments does not really exist.  
 
3.1 Definitions of argument, emotion, and emotional argument   
 
The notion of argument I work with comes from mainly two theorists. First, Gilbert 
writes that “an argument is any disagreement – from the most polite discussion to the 
loudest brawl” (1996, p. 5). And, Daniel J. O’Keefe states that an argument2 involves 
interaction of some sort, thus referring to the process of arguing (1982, p. 4). Considered 
together, an argument is some sort of interaction where there is disagreement between 
parties. This notion of argument necessarily requires more than one party, in order to 
have incompatible views that prompt disagreement. As well, there needs to be interaction 
regarding the incompatible views. Other than that, the communicative interaction that 
occurs (critical discussion, negotiation, quarrel, etc.), the mode of argument that occurs 
(logical, emotional, etc.), and so on, can all vary, provided there are at least two parties 
who communicate about their dissenting views in some capacity.  
In dealing with the “emotional” aspects of argument, I avoid overly philosophical 
or psychological definitions of the term, mostly because this project is aimed at any 
individual in the process of recognizing, mapping, analyzing, handling, facilitating, 
and/or solving emotional arguments. The cognitive or physiological aspects of emotion, 
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for instance, are not that significant in the understanding of emotional argumentation. 
What is important to note about emotion is that it is part and parcel to the social sphere. 
Alison M. Jaggar writes that emotions are 
. . . wrongly seen as necessarily passive or involuntary responses to the 
world. Rather, they are ways in which we engage actively and even 
construct the world. They have both ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ aspects, each 
of which conditions the other; in some respects they are chosen but in 
others they are involuntary; they presuppose language and a social order 
(1989, p. 159).   
Emotion then is a state or feeling we have, voluntarily or involuntarily, consciously or 
unconsciously. It is what we do with emotion that is integral to argumentation. Our state 
or feelings can prompt particular delivery or expressions of arguments; they can be part 
of the structure of arguments; or, we might try and prompt particular states or feelings 
from our listeners. In all cases we should be aware of the context surrounding the 
emotion, who demonstrates the emotion, how the emotion is received by others, and the 
cultural environment, personal experiences, and social context that surround the emotion. 
Because emotions are part of the social sphere, we have an intuitive connection with 
them. Antonio Damasio (1994) has a similar notion of our connection with emotion – we 
feel the right responses and act accordingly in a given situation, and at the same time we 
tend to know when we implement the wrong responses. 
 An emotional argument is a very common occurrence. As humans we are 
susceptible to both feeling and disagreeing or arguing. When a disagreement occurs 
between parties, their emotions can be involved in a number of ways. What follows is a 
first attempt at demonstrating ways that emotions are part of particular argumentation 
dialogues.  
 
3.2 A descriptive account of emotional arguments using Grice and Walton  
 
A concern often voiced about emotional arguments is their lack of containment. It is 
difficult to know them, let alone address them; they do not follow any standard form – 
they come and go on whim as they are fluid. While this might be the situation some 
arguers find themselves in, let’s say in a nasty quarrel, by and large emotions do not 
create a whirlwind of confusion and uncertainty. In dealing with emotional arguments as 
analysts, Paul Grice’s maxims of communication in “Logic and Conversation” (1975) are 
a useful guide. For Grice conversation is cooperative, and as participants of conversation 
you should “make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at 
which it occurs by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you 
are engaged” (1975, p. 26). This is the cooperative principle and there are maxims that 
accompany it – I highlight them here for the purposes of transferring them to emotional 
arguments only.  
Argumentative interactions ideally should abide by the following maxims: arguers 
should speak to the topic, contributions neither being too little or too much; arguers 
should be as clear as possible; arguers’ contribution should be relevant to the topic; 
arguers should not say anything they are not sure of or believe is false (1975, p. 28). An 
important point Grice makes about these maxims, only briefly stated here, is that in 
conversation we sometimes fail to abide by the rules. For emotional arguments, we can 
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consider these all relevant communication rules to adhere to, and the flouting of any 
could be cause for further investigation in the context of emotional arguments (emotional 
fallacies or motivation of emotional arguments, for instance). When these guidelines are 
roughly followed in an emotional argument they could provide for good communicative 
interaction and not chaotic emotional arguments. Grounding emotional arguments in 
Grice’s cooperative principle of conversation demonstrates that emotional arguments can 
occur in productive communicative spaces. 
 In “What is reasoning? What is argument?” (1990) Walton outlines eight types of 
argumentative dialogues. Considering the goals of four dialogues in particular I begin to 
map out how emotion can play a productive role in the argument process by connecting 
the dialogues with the above five ways emotion can be a part of arguments.  
 In a critical discussion the goal of each party is to convince the other (Walton 
1990, p. 413). So, each arguer is justifying her own view and/or refuting the other party’s 
view in order to come to a better understanding of the issues at hand and to ultimately 
resolve the conflict of opinion. In such a context using emotions as reasons could 
contribute to the argumentative process. As well, to a degree, emotional expression can 
help move the dialogue along. Of the four dialogues addressed here, a critical discussion 
is least likely to include all types of emotional argument or even a high degree of 
emotional argumentation generally. This is due to its emphasis on rational discussion as 
outlined by the Pragma-Dialectical model (van Emeren and Grootendorst 2004). In fact, 
in a later work, Walton writes that “‘critical discussion’ is defined as a subtype and 
especially idealized model of the persuasion dialogue” (1998, p. 48). The rules governing 
critical discussions make it difficult to stray from the traditional notion of argumentation 
without violating a preset rule and committing a fallacy, and so emotional reasons and 
expressions can only play a small part in them.  
 In a debate the goal of each party is to persuade a third party (Walton 1990, p. 
413). Here debates can be thought of in the formal context and even informally, where 
two friends, for instance, might be arguing with each other with a third neutral friend who 
is expected to decide the better position. Similar to a critical discussion, though a more 
adversarial context, debates could also include emotional arguments where emotions are 
reasons or used as a means of expression. In this context, the means of expression can be 
a bit more extreme than a critical discussion, as debates can be more intense because of 
the more adversarial atmosphere. As well, using emotion to appeal to a third party’s pity 
or evoke fear in a third party are possibilities. For instance, one party might try to cast 
doubt on the other party’s views, possibly scaring a third party into changing her mind 
with some newfound data. Any type of emotional argument is possible in the context of a 
debate, whereas with a critical discussion there is at least some responsibility to better 
understand the situation, and not just persuade some third party. 
 In a negotiation parties involved aim to maximize their gains (Walton 1990, p. 
413). Parties have different interests and need to come to some sort of settlement, ideally 
where both parties leave the negotiation with something. Slightly different from Walton’s 
notion of negotiation, yet still retaining the same goals, this is not a win-lose context as 
bargaining tends to be, but rather a win-win situation (see Fisher and Ury 1991 for 
interest-based negotiation). In a negotiation, parties can make use of almost any type of 
emotional argument to meet some of their own interests. Using emotion to express the 
importance of the issue, using emotions as reasons for wanting something, evoking pity 
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or fear to alter the other party’s interests are all means to parties moving from their 
opposing interests to a middle-ground of consensual agreement.  
 In a quarrel parties’ goals are to lash out verbally (Walton 1990, p. 413). Inherent 
in a quarrel is emotion, simply because it is almost always what prompts a quarrel, a 
dialogue more emotionally elevated than the others mentioned. In a quarrel parties mainly 
benefit from venting their emotions, and this can take place via any emotional means at 
the party’s disposal – the most obvious being expressing one’s emotions. Unlike the three 
dialogues above, quarrels might have emotions as their claim as well. Something as 
simple as “I am angry with you” could be the issue for a party in a quarrel, whereas this is 
not likely in any of the other dialogues. Quarrels are the most personal, and so emotions 
are commonplace.  
 By connecting the different types of emotional argument with some of Walton’s 
argument dialogues, and specifically the goals of each dialogue, we have a picture of the 
different ways emotions play out in argumentation. Sometimes emotions do not enter into 
a critical discussion, or a negotiation that turns to primarily bargaining for the right 
“price” for example, but sometimes they are important to the arguers and the context, and 
this is when we need to be able to understand their effects on the argument process 
instead of bracketing the emotion as extraneous to the dialogue. 
 The question that arises from work like this is how do we evaluate emotional 
arguments? Maybe once a full representation of emotional arguments is developed, that 
could be tackled. For my concerns here, as long as the maxims of conversation are 
roughly followed, and emotion occurs in any of the ways above, we have an emotional 
argument. Instead of judging its credibility I want to turn to further understanding how 
the emotional argument functions. To do this, understanding the parties involved is 
crucial. Thus far I have touched on different ways emotion can be part of argumentation, 
and how they function in different dialogues – I turn now to focus on the actual arguers 
who bring emotion to the dialogues.  
 
4. THE SOCIAL STYLE MODEL AS A FUNCTIONAL MEANS FOR 
PRACTITIONERS OF ARGUMENT  
 
Emotions come from people, and one of the reasons it is not accepted into mainstream 
argumentation is its tendency to be relative to individuals. Two arguers can react quite 
differently to the same action or statement, for instance. If we have better tools to 
understanding the personalities behind emotional arguments we could understand how to 
deal with the argumentative circumstances as practitioners. Deliniated by Gary T. 
Furlong, one of the tools available to a mediator is the “social style model” (2005). 
Developed in line with the Myers-Briggs Personality Type Indicator, the social style 
model focuses on the externalizations of personality, which means that a third party can 
diagnose a party’s social style without asking her personality questions per se. From a 
practitioner’s point of view, this is a functional approach to assessing personality types 
during conflict resolution. And, since this is a discourse space where emotional 
arguments can run rampant, the social style model can help practitioners, or even parties 
themselves, recognize and work with the predominant style in another party during the 
exchange of arguments. Important to keep in mind is that this is a generalization and not 
an exact science.  
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There are two types of behaviour to determine. The first concerns assertiveness; is 
an individual “ask” or “tell” assertive? By observing her behaviour a third party must 
determine whether an individual is more reserved, keeping thoughts to herself – this is 
ask assertive, or whether an individual is more direct and forceful in interaction – a tell 
assertive stance.  And, the second behaviour deals with responsiveness; is a speaker 
controlled or emotive? If she tends to be distant and formal, focusing on tasks and not 
feelings, then she is control responsive. And, if she is generally animated, displaying 
emotions and/or recognizing them in others, then she is emote responsive (Furlong 2005, 
pp. 193-195). After assessing an individual from these two criteria, one can more or less 
diagnose a social style that an individual is predominantly. The behaviour styles are as 
follows (2005, p. 195):  
 
 
Control Responsive  
 
  ANALYTICAL    DRIVING 
  Ask Assertive     Tell Assertive 
  and     and   
  Control Responsive   Control Responsive  
 
Ask Assertive         Tell Assertive  
   
AMIABLE    EXPRESSIVE 
Ask Assertive    Tell Assertive 
and      and  
Emote Responsive   Emote Responsive  
 
Emote Responsive  
 
 
Each of the styles has a list of typical characteristics. An analytical person is task-
oriented, focuses on details, is a careful decision-maker, and logical. A driver is a fast-
paced, independent, task-oriented, dominating individual. An amiable individual is 
dependable, relationship-centered, supportive, and avoids confrontation. Finally, an 
expressive is animated, energetic, fast-paced, and opinionated (2005, pp. 196-197). Once 
knowing these criteria of arguers in interaction, assessing the emotional arguments in 
terms of their causes or possible roadblocks they present to the conversation as a whole is 
possible. People with different social styles tend not to approach communication in the 
same manner, let alone emotional communication. Thus, one arguer’s emotional 
argument might not jive with her listener simply because her listener does not orient in 
the same manner, and consequently does not really give much credit or acknowledgement 
to the emotional argument.  
 There are different style adjustments that one can make to better suit her 
conversational partner. The one important for emotions in particular surrounds “facts and 
feelings” (2005, p. 203). Should one deal more or less with facts or with feelings? 
Typically, emote responsive individuals, amiables and expressives, will make more use 
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of feelings in their conversations, while drivers and analyticals are more concerned with 
facts. From a third party perspective, being able to diagnose social styles can indicate 
one’s natural tendency in communication. Thus, amiables and expressives might make 
more emotional arguments than directives and analyticals. Furthermore, this might 
happen in ordinary circumstances and not highly “emotional” ones either. This is just to 
emphasize that emotional arguments do not have to be chaotic or loud communicative 
events; giving emotional reasons or being more expressive are average occurrences, 
especially for amiables and expressives.   
When amiables and/or expressives come together in argumentative 
communication, there could be more emotional arguments than a typical conversation. If 
the situation is a highly volatile one the arguments could even impede communication. 
This is where a practitioner could intervene in the process. On the other hand, if 
analyticals and directives come together to discuss the same matter – the arguments will 
be different, maybe even void of obvious emotion. What this shows is that understanding 
the arguer is important to getting an understanding of the arguments that get 
communicated, and having a standard of what types of argument are acceptable winds up 
prejudicing social styles. A trickier situation arises when there is some combination of an 
amiable or expressive with a directive or analytical. When this occurs in conflict 
resolution settings a mediator might translate one party’s message into another party’s 
communication style which provides for a better understanding of the issues typically 
(2005, pp. 206-207). If this were to occur around arguments in general, for instance an 
expressive becomes more emotional in relaying her argument, while the other party 
remains “rational” and fact-driven, a third party could interpret the idea behind the 
emotional expressive and relay it to the more fact-driven party in a manner that would be 
understood, comfortable, and possibly accepted. This requires pulling out the 
enthymematic parts of arguments in conversation, whether they be in emotionally or 
logically styled arguments. 
Further study on this topic should address how to coalesce different arguing 
patterns of arguers in a single interaction and how to translate one means of argument 
language to another. Having concrete measures to deal with these can provide for 
smoother communication with resolutions that parties can come to agree on. As well, 
though it is not the focus in this paper, the social style model shows that all social types 
have typical back-up reactions used in modes of crisis. Argumentative situations could be 
perplexing spaces for some, and so back-up styles might be acted on while arguing. As 
practitioners to argumentative situations, knowing social indicators of back-up 
behaviours can help parties come to agreement as well. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
Emotional arguments, especially when expressed naturally and genuinely, need serious 
address. Refraining from the endeavour for fear of fallacious content is a concern set up 
by traditional argumentation, but it need not be the case. There is no question that 
emotions used to purposely manipulate a situation can be obvious violations of proper 
argumentation. However, as Walton writes, “emotion should not be (categorically) 
opposed to reason, even though appeals to emotion can go wrong or be exploited in some 
cases” (1992, p. 257). Whether emotional arguments are good ones is neither here nor 
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there for this project specifically – it is study for the future and already initiated by 
Gilbert (1997b). Before full normative notions of emotional arguments can be tackled, a 
thorough descriptive model still needs to be developed. Something to keep in mind is that 
there is a spectrum of emotion at play in any communicative act, simply because we are 
human. Gilbert writes that “communication will be more or less emotional running from 
nearly pure emotional states to ones that are hardly emotional at all” (1997a, p. 84). It 
makes sense to at least begin mapping out what the more emotional states of arguing look 
like.  
This paper has put forth a descriptive account of emotional argumentation. 
Bringing together the notions of Gilbert (1997), Ben-Ze’ev (1995, 1996), and Plantin 
(1999) gives at least five types of emotional argumentation to start. Depending on the 
dialogue – while four were mentioned in this paper, there are more to investigate – 
emotional arguments can function to achieve particular goals of the discourse. And, 
finally, even with definitions, conversational rules, dialogues, and goals considered, truly 
understanding emotional arguments requires an understanding of the arguers. To address 
this last point I referred to a tool available to dispute resolution practitioners. Adapted, 
the social style model (Furlong 2005) can help make sense of emotional arguers and their 
arguments, but more than that it brings together different styles of arguing so that 
agreement can occur between parties in disagreement.  
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